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Meeting or defining basic human needs has long been 
a primary concern of policy makers, social theorists, 
social scientists, philosophers, and a host of other 
professionals. Indeed, we can find Plato, in Book IX 
of the Republic, making distinctions between basic 
needs and wants. More modern theorists build on the 
distinction between basic and derived needs to erect 
various hierarchies of needs. These distinctions can 
indeed be drawn, but they are not useful for social 
planning or handling issues in social and political 
philosophy such as rights to have basic needs met. 
Instead, the distinction between basic and derived 
needs, and the hierarchies which may be built on it, 
lead to an increase in the degree of professional con-
trol over our lives. This surfaces as a lessening of 
autonomy considered as the capacity to exercise choice 
and make plans, and as a lessening of the actual free-
dom with which to choose. 
My argument for this claim will be made by accom-
plishing the following tasks: 1) a description of three 
need dichotomies and the hierarchies built on them; 2) 
scrutiny of the way in which such distinctions and 
hierarchies lead to professional control resulting in a 
loss of autonomy and various liberties; 3) identifica-
tion of the root cause for the inadequacy of such dis-
tinctions; and, 4) a brief presentation of ideas toward 
a solution. 
1. MEED DICHOTOMIES AMD HIERARCHIES 
The language of needing reflects a very deep belief 
in a recurring dichotomy reflected in the following 
contrasts between types of needs: basic/derived, vi-
tal/heteronomous, objective/subjective, biological/so-
cial, true/false (Marcuse speaks of "false conscious-
ness" to go along with these needs 1), and needs and 
drives/wants, preferences, interests, choices (implying 
a difference between brute animal needs and needs aris-
ing because of our capacity to make plans and direct 
our activities in accord with them). Surely we can 
reach agreement, one may ask, on the general fact of 
basic needs for air, water, food, clothing, shelter, 
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and perhaps even sex? Certainly. Surely we can agree 
that luxuries, or something we just want, are not basic 
needs? Certainly. Nonetheless, the inadequacy of 
these distinctions will clearly emerge when we examine 
the conversion of these abstract terms into specific 
things, products, and services which would be experi-
enced as meeting the need. 
However, there is debate even at the abstract lev-
el. For some would exclude clothing and perhaps even 
shelter from the category of basic needs because, under 
certain conditions like those of South Seas islanders 
or Australian aborigines, neither clothes nor shelter 
appear necessary. Others would exclude sex since a 
life of celibacy is certainly possible. Someone else 
would appeal to some idea of normalcy and add these 
back in, along with companionship, energy and health 
care or even education and transportation. Such a 
state of affairs has led Norman Daniels to conclude 
that there is no satisfactory theory of needs.2 
Behind such discussions about needs lurks an old 
desire to get at some sort of essential human nature, 
to find the necessary conditions for a distinctly human 
existence, at least biologically considered. Also, the 
decision as to what constitutes basic needs has a moral 
significance if "rights" claims are based on needs. If 
needs establish rights, nearly all agree that such 
needs must be objective, however they are defined.1 
Some attempts to resolve this problem have led to the 
building of hierarchies on top of the dichotomy of 
basic vs. derived needs. Three representative examples 
will be examined to see the ways such distinctions 
work. 
Maslow's Five Step Needs Hierarchy 
The best known "needs hierarchy" is that of the 
theoretical psychologist Abraham Maslow.* In Maslow's 
theory there are five levels of needing, beginning with 
basic needs which are physiological. A drowning man 
wants air and at that moment, needs nothing more. 
Should he survive, his needs escalate to security 
requirements, insuring that air, food, shelter, water, 
and so on may be taken for granted. Beyond these basic 
needs we pass into social and personal needs. Since 
these are not usually immediate threats to survival if 
lost, most people use the language of wants, pref-
erences, and interest to describe them. Maslow gives 
us three categories at this level. Belongingness is a 
need to be part of a social community, a group. Self-
esteem is described as a need to be recognized, to have 
a sense of worth, peer approval, accomplishment. Last 
we find self-actualization, the need for self-fulfill-
ment, for completeness, for being all you can be. 
Maslow believes that the lower needs must be met before 
the higher ones can be felt and that a person should 
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strive to achieve at the higher levels, transcending 
the need to accumulate material goods. Maslow's needs 
hierarchy develops into a theory of human nature and a 
prescription for the good life. More recent philo-
sophical writers have refined the hierarchy to handle 
problems about rights-claims and distributive justice. 
A Right to Normalcy 
David Braybrooke considers basic needs to be of two 
sorts.' First, there are course-of-life needs which 
everyone must have either throughout life or at certain 
times, like infancy, in order to function as a normal 
member of the species. Related to these are special 
needs an individual may have because he is a diabetic, 
an amputee, or so on, which are labeled variation 
needs. Both types are objective needs and carry moral 
primacy.' Other needs are for day-to-day life in the 
sense of needing a tool, or for long range plans such 
as needing an education, and are adventitious, lacking 
moral obligation to be met. He goes on to describe 
social status and social change needs, but leaves un-
clear where to draw the line on their degree of objec-
tivity, on their moral primacy, on the obligation that 
they be met. 7 His problem lies in deciding just what 
is normal for the human species, a problem even at the 
physiological level." "Normal" is largely determined 
by social factors. My sense of self and my normal ex-
istence may be threatened by losses that prevent earn-
ing income at a high level, such as a surgeon losing 
use of his hands. Does this become a variation need? 
Because of social changes many consider a car a neces-
sity in Los Angeles. Is this a form of variation need? 
Braybrooke appears to recognize these difficulties, but 
does not tackle them. His theory paints him into a 
corner. He does not want to prescribe a proper life 
because he believes we should have more freedom to de-
fine it individually and locally. But his needs theory 
seems to commit him to it by relying on a concept of 
normalcy which goes beyond biological necessity. 
A theory of needs as dichotomies or hierarchies 
does prescribe a notion of a good life. It does so 
through presupposing the criteria by which the distinc-
tions are drawn. To decide something is X rather than 
Y entails a theoretical framework grounding the dis-
tinction. Examples would include the criteria for be-
ing human, as in the abortion controversy, or what con-
stitutes membership in a species, or what are the 
properties of a living organism, or what constitutes 
being real vs. being an illusion or a mere subjective 
phenomenon. Making distinctions with moral overtones 
concerning basic or derived needs likewise requires 
decision-relevant criteria. The basis of these criter-
ia must be sought in a theory of the proper or normal 
human life. This outcome is unavoidable because all 
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conceptions of basic needs are initially couched in the 
language of rudimentary existence or bare survival. As 
we move into derived needs and up the hierarchy these 
needs are always described in terms of a more satis-
fying and meaningful life. McCloskey, the last example 
of a needs hierarchy theory, boldly takes the plunge 
and relates his needs theory to a theory of human 
nature and the proper life.9 
A Right to What is Good for Us 
McCloskey makes the normative claim that the only 
items which should be counted as needs arise from a 
consideration of human nature, especially the human 
potential for good, or from consideration of what is 
necessary for the continued existence of individuals 
with potential for good, such that the good can be ac-
tualized, the development not impaired or marred. 1 0 
What we need relates to what is good for us as humans. 
McCloskey, by defining human nature in terms of capaci-
ties for rationality, sentience, emotional capacity, 
and imagination, would disagree with Braybrooke that a 
society's normal expectations can determine needs. 
Meeds for what is adverse to our good development or 
existence are false needs no matter how strongly they 
are felt or held to be "normal." Here McCloskey sounds 
much like Marcuse when he discusses false needs and the 
false consciousness which makes the experience of them 
seem to be vital or true. 1 1 Like so many others, 
McCl6skey is committed to the view that where a true 
need exists, resources should be directed to its satis-
faction. 1 8 McCloskey, like Braybrooke, is concerned 
that needs, due to their moral primacy, may require 
such attention that resources for individual interests 
or Braybrooke's adventitious needs, may be lacking. 
McCloskey thus wishes to restrict the concept of needs. 
However, the distinction is not easily amenable to res-
triction on the conceptual level and certainly not so 
in the political arena. Neither "normalcy" nor the 
necessities for a proper life fill the bill when we 
seek criteria for deciding what we have rights to or 
how to allocate resources based on those rights. 
It appears that defining human nature and the good 
or proper life has been successful only within fairly 
stable or isolated communities or societies. Most 
modern-day theorists emphasize development of capaci-
ties and capabilities such as rational free agency, 
responsibility, autonomy, liberty, and the like. 1 1 
Basic needs, whatever they are, generally are portrayed 
as necessary conditions for these capabilities.!* 
While this sounds reasonable enough, great care must be 
exercised in moving from needs to rights. 
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Needs and Justice 
Theories of justice usually proclaim that the for-
mal principle of justice is that the distribution of 
burdens and benefits should fall equally unless there 
is a material, that is, a morally relevant reason, to 
distribute them otherwise. Developing a material prin-
ciple of justice is what lets us decide whether ine-
qualities are just and whether there is a right to hav-
ing any specific inequalities redressed. Needs and 
merit are two favored material principles, but needs 
seem easiest to define because of Rawls's argument that 
many, if not all, of the factors resulting in merit can 
be traced to good or bad fortune.1* 
A major advantage for professionals and politicians 
results from the emphasis on need as the well-spring of 
rights and as the basis of unequal distributions to 
redress needs. It gives the politician a moral base 
for the advocacy of programs which may be useful in 
getting votes. After all, who could be against meeting 
basic human needs? Professionals benefit because it is 
usually their services which are prescribed to study 
the extent of the need, suggest solutions and then ad-
minister or work in the programs which will meet the 
needs. Social planners usually move straight from the 
idea that having needs implies having rights to allo-
cating specific goods and services. This occurs 
without considering whether it is clear how far needs 
go in making rights claims. "Normalcy" seems too easy 
to inflate and seems questionable to many in terms of 
whether normal is appropriate, proper, or good. As 
already noted, because of inflationary tendencies, use 
of normalcy as a criterion threatens liberty by making 
it appear possible to have a right to whatever we 
strongly want so long as our "normalcy" would be im-
paired without it. The other approach, basing rights 
on a theory of proper human nature and what is needed 
for it, promises to be undemocratic. To tell a person 
that what they need, even for their survival, is a 
false need owning to false consciousness sounds like 
the imposition of one's views on another. This is 
tyranny if such persons control the relocation of re-
sources which meet needs, however defined.1' 
As is common in philosophy, we find disagreement at 
the abstract level and not just when converting cate-
gories like food, clothes, and shelter into actual 
items such as steak or rice, furs or jeans, two-story 
houses or adobe huts. Whereas normalcy will do for 
Braybrooke and Daniels, McCloskey and Marcuse focus on 
the "proper" life. In spite of disagreements about hu-
man nature, the proper life, normal human functioning, 
or where to draw the line between true and false needs, 
or objective and non-objective needs, there does seem 
to be some agreement between these theorists concerning 
the threat to liberty from inflation of rights claims. 
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2. MEETING NEEDS AND PROFESSIONAL CONTROL 
Virtually all of these students of human needs have 
expressed concern over how the concept of needs is in-
flated at the expense of liberties or resources which 
would go to meet desires, preferences, interests, or 
adventitious needs. It appears that meeting the neces-
sary conditions for the exercise of our rationality, 
our liberty, and our autonomy may become such vast 
tasks that opportunities for the exercise of these val-
ued human activities may become even more remote. The 
determination of there being an objective need leads to 
a rights claim. This holds true no matter what sort of 
theory grounds these assessments of needs: normalcy, 
proper human function, the proper conditions for a be-
coming existence, or others. At some point of escala-
ting needs and the correlated rights claims there will 
be few resources left for preferences, adventitious 
needs, or even liberty. A powerful way to avoid con-
fronting this issue is to assume constant economic 
growth and to proclaim the eventual benefits of such 
growth to those whose needs are not now being met. The 
possibility of finite resources or the impact of grow-
ing per capita consumption of material goods on those 
resources or the environment goes largely unconsidered 
in the rush for technological mastery and ever more 
economic growth. 
Professionalization of Needs 
If there are objective needs and if they carry a 
moral mandate to be satisfied, there should be little 
surprise that vast institutions and legions of profes-
sional cadres spring into being in order to do good. 
The ideals of liberty, autonomy, service, and the like 
give such institutions an official mission, justifying 
their existence in terms of doing good, of beneficence. 
But the impact of these institutions, what happens as 
they carry out their mission, may be far different. 
Indeed, it will be argued that many of the institutions 
set up to meet our needs have allowed professional con-
trol of those needs. 1 7 
This process probably brings to mind the image of 
capitalists undermining indigenous and relatively self-
sustaining cultures. By first tapping or exploiting 
them for raw materials or cheap labor, the basis of 
local autonomy and a locally sustained economy—use of 
local resources and the skills to utilize them—is un-
dermined in favor of a limited number of activities 
carried out primarily for wages. Secondly, as the in-
come level rises, such that poverty is the inability to 
consume or buy rather than to produce, these areas 
become markets for sale of goods produced elsewhere. A 
previously self-sustaining economy becomes merged with-
in the international economy and finds itself subject 
461 
to the new vagaries of oil prices, inflation, monetary 
valuations, policies of creditors, and the World Bank. 
We call this development. The professionalization pro-
cess, however, takes this further, and is found also in 
the industrial-developed areas. 
Meeting Needs Requires Consumption 
The professionalization process converts the person 
in need into a consumer of professionally administered 
and designed outputs. For a person socialized in an 
industrial society, having a need translates into a 
consideration of how to obtain the currency necessary 
to purchase something to satisfy the need. It is 
almost totally alien to conceive of meeting a need by 
some sort of personal or group activity. Where this 
still occurs, the area is considered to be underdevel-
oped. Needs, wants, preferences, or interests once met 
locally or individually are now met only by consumption 
of outputs over which there is increasingly little lo-
cal or individual control. The industrial solution to 
a need for transportation is an example. 
Automobiles designed to meet a need for transporta-
tion have come to dominate the society. Local re-
sources usually cannot produce an automobile, and fre-
quently cannot repair it. Moreover, as speeds increase 
and congestion intensifies, non-mechanized means of 
transport are crowded off the roads by cars. As the 
society has reorganized to take advantage of the au-
tomobile, the distances required to go where one wants 
have increased. Non-mechanized movement has become 
mostly recreation. Few people walk, run, or bicycle to 
get anywhere, at least in order to really do anything 
like shop, work, or even visit. Freeways often split 
cohesive neighborhoods as effectively as rivers, rend-
ering non-mechanized movement virtually impossible and 
leaving even vehicular movement inconvenient. 
Paradoxically, the freedom automobiles give is pur-
chased at the cost of dependence, a dependence made 
clear when they break. The awareness of this depen-
dence and the lack of options became generally clear 
for a short time during the 1974 gas shortage. A 
national panic nearly ensued. The cost to the world in 
terms of resources used to support this method of meet-
ing a need, promises to render it a short term experi-
ment. The point here is that we have traded in an en-
tire social structure based on local resources and 
skills for one designed and administered by others less 
under our influence. One set of choices on how to meet 
needs was replaced by a different set, but a set less 
under our control. The precariousness of the new means 
of meeting needs becomes apparent only when threatened, 
and then the lack of local solutions becomes evident. 
The dependency is clearest to those who lack automo-
biles but are faced with meeting needs by methods which 
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presuppose them. No longer can the typical member of 
industrial society go where he wants to get what he 
needs under his own power. He must rely on consuming 
professionally designed and administered outputs, be 
they automobiles, roads, or mass transit. Thus, the 
poverty of a ghetto dweller relative to transportation 
is deeper than that of a peasant in an underdeveloped 
area. The peasant can probably obtain what satisfies 
his needs, without the frustrations of mass transit and 
without his being reminded that he is the second-class 
poor because he lacks a car. 
That; most people in an industrial society need a 
car is an example of Braybrooke's social change needs. 
The persons rendered poor and dependent by the social 
changes of industrialization are what Illich calls the 
modernized poor.1' They are poor because of social 
changes which require consumption of what others pro-
duce in order to meet needs. The social infrastructure 
has disappeared by which their own labor could directly 
meet their needs by using local resources and the local 
economy. Skills are valuable only to the extent they 
command a wage, not at all in terms of satisfying a 
need directly. Thus, a major aspect of industrializa-
tion and the professionalization process is converting 
producers into consumers of products largely controlled 
by others. The next stage in the professionalization 
process finds the professional capable of defining the 
person as having a need for that which only the profes-
sional can ascertain, provide, or determine if the need 
was met. Medicine exemplifies this final step in the 
professionalization process. 
Professionalization in Medicine 
Medicine is largely founded on the value of benefi-
cence, benefitting the injured and sick. By and large, 
we decide if we are injured or sick, although that de-
cision is not always left to the individual, especially 
in cases of mental illness. But in any case, once we 
consult a practitioner of the healing arts, we often 
lose control over our need. The professional or pro-
vider defines what our need is, what will meet the 
need, and often is considered the only one competent to 
determine if what he provided in fact met the need he 
originally defined. The consumer presents a pain or 
symptom, the physician tells him what he has, what he 
needs, and then is often the only one who can say if it 
worked. The latter situation is often true for symp-
toms that only show up in x-rays or lab tests. Fur-
ther, like most specialized activities, a highly tech-
nical language is used among the providers, making in-
formed consent or even the explanation of the need dif-
ficult. Yet the loss of control to professionals ex-
tends further than that. 
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Physicians have a legal monopoly on the practice of 
medicine, extending to its very definition. This is 
the final step in professionalization. Thus the con-
sumer, even if he were motivated to learn the language 
and become knowledgeable about therapies and medicines, 
would find he could not get them without the physi-
cian's orders. The inability to do anything with the 
knowledge you could obtain undermines any desire to get 
it. One result of such a legal monopoly, presumably to 
protect the public, is that there is no motivation to 
exercise one's autonomy in medical matters other than 
in choosing providers or signing consents. It is en-
couraging that reactions to this monopoly have arisen 
and seem to be gaining strength. This is not to say we 
should practice medicine on ourselves, although many 
afflictions can be properly diagnosed and treated with-
out the training required to be licensed as a physi-
cian. It is to say that the entire domain of health 
care as a need has been taken over by professionals. 
Most of us have no reason to do more than be consumers. 
This, then, is the professionalization process: 
define the need, what will meet it, whether it was met, 
all the while holding the client responsible for com-
pliance with the prescription. Small wonder too that 
justice is now conceived largely as a distributive pro-
blem.1' Individuals and local communities no longer 
even conceive of actions which might lead to meeting a 
need through local skills and resources. Obtaining the 
resources to expend is the economic issue. How to dis-
tribute them equitably to needy consumers is the jus-
tice problem. 
One root of this justice problem is the emphasis on 
meeting objective needs. Even a thinker such as Fried, 
who seeks to solve the distribution problem without 
basing rights on needs, still voices concern about de-
fining objective needs.*" Who gives that definition, 
and what it is, appear to be matters of consequence, 
for there is great power for those who can specify an 
objective need and compel resources for their satisfac-
tion by whatever scheme that is "just," whether Rawls', 
Nozick's, Fried*s or some other. It is no surprise to 
find that expansion of the need concept is a means for 
professionals to gain more power under the guise of 
service to mankind. A rethinking of the concept of 
need may enable the "consumer" to regain control over 
his own needs, defining them, deciding what meets them, 
determining if they were met, and thereby exercising 
his capacity for autonomy and his choice-making skills, 
making him a self-provider. 
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3. THE CAUSE FOR INADEQUATE DISTINCTIONS 
ABOUT NEEDS: NEEDS ARE FAR MORE THAN NUMBERS 
One of the most glaring problems with professional 
control of needs, defined objectively, is that human 
needs are reduced to numbers: square feet of housing, 
minimum daily requirements of calories, vitamins and 
minerals, certain temperature ranges of BTU's for com-
fortable living, specified dollar amounts for minimal 
life-style, completion of X years of education before 
being educated, and so on. In one sense, some of these 
measures are accurate. Biologically, we can be fairly 
objective in saying what mere survival requires. But 
human needing has far more than a mere material compo-
nent. Virtually every human need also carries a sym-
bolic, social component.11 Failing to recognize this 
and looking at needs merely as a need for food, cloth-
ing, shelter, and the like, often leads to rejection of 
the professionally provided goods on the part of the 
ones supposedly being helped. However, recognizing the 
social component means that needs become excessive. 
Some examples may make this two-sided concept of need-
ing clearer. 
The Breakdown of Conservative Solutions 
Conservative solutions to needs tend to stress the 
quantitative or objective sense of needs, the bare min-
imum. Liberal solutions attempt to go beyond such bare 
minima and allow for what they consider dignity or the 
quality of life. But neither seems to work. Conserva-
tive programs are castigated as miserly, inhuman, cru-
el, while liberal programs promise bankruptcy and such 
a degree of professional intervention that meeting the 
needs eclipses the very liberties and capacities which 
are the liberal's ends. 
Failures are easy to spot. Ghetto housing has 
provided more square feet of living space, more facili-
ties in terms of plumbing, but destroyed the sense of 
having a home, leading to widespread abuse and vandal-
ism. A home is not merely a number of square feet.~ 
Nor is food just any substance with the proper nutri-
tional mix. Certain African tribes starve before eat-
ing fish. Present rack of German Shepherd or horse 
steaks to most Americans and they will not consider it 
food. Muslims will refuse pork. Calling catsup a veg-
etable did not go over big in the Federal school lunch 
program. Food is something more than its nutritional 
value. The same may be said of clothing and most other 
"objective" needs. 
Bankruptcy or Paternalism: The Liberal Dilemma 
Looking at needs apart from the social component 
plays into the hands of those who will define another's 
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needs in a primarily quantitative manner. It strips 
away the basic social mechanism by which individuals, 
groups, and communities distinguish themselves from one 
another. How we create a sense of identity and mean-
ingfulness goes directly to the heart of why merely 
quantitative considerations of needs will be of little 
interest to the persons bureaucrats and social planners 
wish to assist. The quantitative approach reduces ev-
eryone to a common level while our basic urge to devel-
op an identity leads us to reject such leveling. But 
going the other way, recognizing the social component, 
leads to a vast escalation of needs under the rubric of 
being humanistic, seeing and treating the people ac-
cording to the way they are. We want to help people 
retain their identity. How they meet needs contributes 
to the meaningfulness of this identity. But it may be 
that what is meaningful is less cost efficient and less 
effective from a quantitative perspective. The moral 
obligation to meet needs, now quasi-objective, con-
fronts resource scarcity. Most people, professionals 
included, would prefer to help those they serve, get 
more of what meets their unique definition of a need. 
This beneficent impulse unwittingly adds to profes-
sional power. Part of the problem is rooted in the 
drive to convert activities which meet needs into wage 
earning so needs can be met by purchases. But this 
conversion benefits the professional because what has 
to be bought is usually more or less scarce, requiring 
his help to obtain. 
The professional himself even benefits from the 
scarcity problem. He becomes an expert on that cul-
ture, an advocate getting a bigger piece of the pie for 
his clients in the zero-sum game that some now see dis-
tributive justice becoming.22 Serving needs, helping 
define them, is almost a description of how to get 
political power. Bigger programs, more institutions, 
happier consumers are a desired result. As a side-
effect, those consumers have less need to exercise 
their autonomy because others are defining and meeting 
their needs. As already described, the local infra-
structure which once had the skills and resources to 
meet most needs disappears. Instead of seeking re-
sources by which to redevelop such local autonomy, the 
primary question is how to distribute what someone else 
produces or to bring in a new industry which will pay 
high wages. Money then allows the power to consume. 
Given enough "power," basic needs are said to be met. 
Any productive activity apart from job performance is 
never considered. Developing local skills and resour-
ces for production of what is needed locally is an al-
most bizzare notion to social planners or those voicing 
right claims. Indeed, virtually all the activities of 
industrial people other than leisure and recreation can 
be interpreted as adjuncts to wage labor. 
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Shadow Work 
An interesting development in highly industrialized 
societies is "shadow work." This has been defined by 
Ivan Illich as unpaid work which is necessary for paid 
wage labor to take place.2' Such work includes house-
work which makes it possible for the husband to be ab-
sent from the household and engage in paid labor. 
Interestingly, this domestic, unpaid, typically female 
labor, is not called work nor given the status of being 
considered in productivity measures. On a different 
level, the preparation of the public for entry into 
wage labor and their continued success in the job 
market is described as meeting a need. We need an edu-
cation, we need a car to commute to work. We spend 
time shopping to buy what we need. None of this is 
typically considered work and is certainly unpaid. The 
interesting point is that our very needs have changed 
in a fundamental way, one which meshes with the wage 
labor requirements of industrial societies. Instead of 
needing to learn how to produce something to meet a 
need, we need an education in order to get a job which 
will provide wages to buy what we need. In this sense 
we learn to market ourselves. Should we break down or 
burn out there are various therapies we need, from 
stress management to counseling. In an industrial 
society the structure of needing has changed from the 
skills and materials required for local production to 
the skills and credentials necessary to earn wages. 
The enormous amount of unpaid labor required to make 
wage labor possible is a largely unrecognized version 
of shadow work. But shadow work goes even further. 
At even higher levels of industrialization and con-
sumption exemplified by families with two wage earners, 
we do find consumers involved in production. In order 
to save busy consumers time and to cut down on expenses 
the products are left unfinished. Furniture may need 
assembly and finishing. Consumers learn to serve them-
selves and even clean up the tables in fast food out-
lets. Self-help industries emerge with kits for all 
manner of items, even houses. Indeed, our choices as 
consumers have increased and, in a certain sense, our 
freedom. Whether this add-on shadow work contributes 
to Braybrooke's desire that alternate life-styles be 
possible (second order preferences) or whether it mere-
ly ties us further into the dependency grids of con-
sumption and wage labor remains to be seen. In any 
case, professional definition and control over our op-
tions by escalation of a need for what they have into a 
right to have it promises to undermine the liberty to 
live outside of their prescriptions. 
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Rights Eclipse Liberties 
Professionals get together to plan programs for 
their constituents, ranging from housing, transporta-
tion, and education, to health care. Not surprisingly, 
consumers' needs seem to escalate along with the cries 
of professionals for the resources to meet them. Since 
basic needs must be met before anything else, it is 
less clear when the consumers' "higher human interests" 
will be exercised. In a somewhat Hegelian sense, the 
whole tradition of dominating or controlling nature to 
meet (basic) needs so that higher human interests can 
be developed seems to have met its contradiction as the 
means swallow the end and even make it unlikely. The 
professionalization process, which expresses this larg-
er trend concretely, has become so widespread that the 
language of needing presupposes it. 
Changes in the Language of Needing 
As noted earlier about medicine, the persons deemed 
in need find themselves labeled as consumers by the 
providers of their needs who also often define those 
needs. Needs change slowly from activities expressed 
by verbs to objects designated by nouns, the products 
of institutional output.2* "Need" itself has changed 
from primarily a verb use to a predominant noun use, as 
what we need becomes more and more related to consump-
tion and wage labor rather than production skills. 
Education as a product or service replaces the personal 
language of "to learn." People now speak of having 
work instead of doing it. The implication: the re-
placement of personal activities by professional ser-
vices or products. As a last example of this implicit 
thinking of needs in terms of what someone else does, 
note that the phrase "the health care delivery system" 
leads one to think health is something like a product 
one gets, like delivered milk. In a larger context, 
this phenomenon points to an experiencing of what our 
needs are and what will meet them primarily in terms of 
products and services provided by others. In other 
words, what we need and how it will be satisfied occurs 
within the horizon of commodities.2* Rather obvious 
problems for autonomy and liberty begin to emerge if 
the class of objective needs not only expands but comes 
to be defined and controlled by the professionals who 
provide the products and services to satisfy the pre-
sumed needs. 
4. REGAINING CONTROL OVER OUR NEEDS 
One way to begin enabling people to regain control 
over their needs is to follow Fried in denying an ab-
solute obligation to satisfy objective needs. What 
that means would require much more work than a brief 
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paper such as this can provide. The second step is to 
recognize that needs are nearly always experienced with 
a social component. I do not need calories and nu-
trients when hungry. I need specific things which are 
conceived as food: a hamburger, an orange, some milk, 
and so on. When I need shelter, it is not just square 
feet I need. .And the same goes for clothing, transpor-
tation, health care, and so on. Part of this recogni-
tion of an inevitable symbolic aspect to the human ex-
perience of needing is to follow William Leiss in de-
nying the usefulness of the old dichotomies noted 
earlier in this paper." 
These need theories were often tied, implicitly and 
explicitly, to some view of a proper human life or the 
true human nature. Use of a dichotomous-hierarchical 
needs theory, in concert with the professionalization 
of needs, would allow one's own theory of human nature 
and the proper life to be implemented through the power 
of the institutions most professionals work within: 
medicine, law, business, education, and government. Of 
course, a view of proper human functioning and develop-
ment underlies this critique. As opposed to an empha-
sis on providing goods and services, the view of proper 
human functioning and development presupposed by this 
critique is one which seeks to enhance the development 
of the ability to deliberate and reason; to facilitate 
weighing alternatives on the basis of decision-relevant 
information; to be able to understand rules and the 
conduct they require; in short, to develop responsible 
and autonomous individuals and give them the room, the 
freedom, to exercise these capabilities. To achieve 
this we would be better served by returning control of 
needs to laypersons, helping them become thinking, 
responsible, autonomous providers, instead of never-
satisfied consumers. Now, "control over our needs" 
does not require production to meet those needs in the 
sense of self-sufficiency. It refers to a balance 
between needs met by local and personal methods versus 
being forced to buy all items needed. A balance be-
tween bought and made can enhance liberty. Detailing 
this balance and how to achieve it is a larger task. 
Some suggestions are given later in the essay. 
What is emphasized here is not patterned end states 
or the specification of initial starting conditions un-
der which a distribution would be just. Instead, the 
point is to see the effect of completely losing the 
ability to meet needs outside of consumption, resulting 
in the possibility of professional control over our 
lives. This occurs as professionals seek to make good 
on rights claims which are based on needs for what is 
now available only by purchase. Under modern condi-
tions of a market-driven industrial society, starting 
with need dichotomies and hierarchies leads to profes-
sional imposition of a professionally developed view of 
proper human living. The view that where a basic need 
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exists there also exists a primary moral obligation to 
meet it is the fuel for this process. 
Beyond Distribution and Commodities 
A benefit of libertarian theory has been to ques-
tion the emphasis on distribution and the source of 
goods.1' Of course, libertarians presuppose the mar-
ket-driven industrial society that is being questioned 
here. Rather than follow traditional theorists into a 
consideration of the justness of end-state principles 
and patterned distributions, it seems more profitable 
to question the very presuppositions about the needs 
these theories are somehow trying to satisfy equitably. 
Liberty and autonomy should mean more than choices 
among commodities. Braybrooke says as much when be 
bemoans the loss of second-order preferences between 
ways of life and specific vocations.2' The use of au-
tonomy in such choices, the having of freedom and op-
portunities to actually live an unconventional life, 
speaks of preferences that indicate reflection on what 
is valuable in one's life. McCloskey, wishing to re-
strict needs in favor of interests and good human ex-
istence, is on the same track.2* Illich, in advocating 
a lifestyle not dominated by wage-labor as a means of 
meeting needs, certainly has in mind a use of autonomy 
and freedom other than choice among commodities.10 
Perhaps even Rawls, speaking of life-plans, could be 
construed in a similar light.'1 Libertarians however, 
seem to presuppose the sort of economy which defines 
man as acquisitive and who finds satisfaction in con-
sumption. The result seems to be incompatible with 
their own values.'2 
5. BEYOND NEED DICHOTOMIES 
What then does it mean to deny the usefulness of 
needs dichotomies and hierarchies? What do we do about 
meeting needs if we must protect autonomy and liberty 
from professional erosion by denying that a need im-
plies a right? Certainly all these questions are not 
answered in a brief paper. Some directions towards the 
answers are possible though. Denying the usefulness of 
need dichotomies and hierarchies is in one sense an 
abandonment of trying to develop a theory about the 
nature of man and then to make the theory true by im-
plementation of vast programs. The quest abandoned is 
that of seeking a substantive essence of man, one which 
lends itself to professionalization. The view advo-
cated is one of man as a process of self-definition, 
individually and culturally." Further required in 
this process is a recognition of the power of basic be-
liefs to influence our behavior and our institutions, a 
power so strong it sometimes creates the cultural real-
ity it requires to sustain itself. Key to this process 
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is a theory of man as capable of autonomy, responsibil-
ity, and freedom and a view of the proper life as one 
which maximizes these capabilities. But is not this 
just as likely to result in professionalization of 
needs, one may ask? Or will it culminate in a theory 
of needs which classifies as basic those goods which 
enhance or make possible autonomy? To be sure, any 
theory can be perverted; it would be naive to think 
otherwise. But it does not seem that what is being 
suggested will result in Rousseau's "forcing people to 
be free." 
The process view of man which picks certain proces-
ses such as achieving autonomy as proper would, instead 
of "forcing freedom," find the end in the means. 
Encouragement of these capabilities by resource alloca-
tions and social programs may indeed encourage people 
to make choices and take responsibilities for them. 
But this is not coercion in any usual sense, but rather 
a reaffirmation of the dignity and worth of indivi-
duals. On the other hand, making the choices for ano-
ther or rendering him so dependent that any remaining 
choices are specious certainly does not reaffirm these 
values, even if it may appear from a paternalistic per-
spective to better meet his "needs." 
Fostering Patient Autonomy in Health Care 
A good example of responsibility-enhancing resource 
allocations is informed consent in medicine. Health 
care' professionals could be trained to encourage par-
ticipatory decision making. Hospitals could do more 
work in patient education, including education about 
patient rights. Reimbursement could shift to encompass 
time spent in discussion instead of getting paid only 
upon ordering procedures or tests. Hospitals could 
operate institutional ethics committees to ensure that 
rights are respected. Employers and insurors could 
educate employees and policy holders about their spe-
cific diseases and rights. Consumer groups could do 
the same. All of this would encourage the individual 
to ask questions, be assertive, and actually get an-
swers in advance of hospitalization to questions which 
otherwise may not be asked. Such programs would 
encourage and enable people to make choices and take 
responsibility for them. This is not coercion, unless 
one cannot refuse to participate, or cannot abdicate 
his authority to the professional. There is indeed a 
theory of human nature and its proper functioning here, 
but one which rests decision making in the individual. 
Rethinking the Origin of Needs 
On a more theoretical level, one way to begin 
rethinking this issue of human being and needs is to 
question the idea that we value what we need. Looking 
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for what we need in order to decide what is valuable 
leads us into blind alleys. Reversing the statement, 
to say that we need what we value, focvises the axiolog-
ical inquiry properly on values and causes us to really 
begin thinking at a fundamental philosophical level 
about world views, absolute presuppositions, the nature 
of objects, our experience of them, and so forth. 
While these alleys are not well lit, they at least hold 
promise of going in a direction that safeguards au-
tonomy and liberty in a fundamental way. When inquiry 
is directed to values as the foundation, the inquirer 
is more likely to consider life-plans, the meaning of a 
good human existence, and second-order preferences than 
if he begins by considering his needs. 
At this point, the distinction between values and 
needs should be clearly drawn. However, a foray into 
valuation theory would lead too far astray. The point 
of phrasing the inquiry in terms of needing what we 
value is primarily heuristic. For the very language of 
needing has become so dominated by the thought of pro-
fessional solutions, providing, consuming, and dis-
tributing goods and services, that it does not lead us 
to think at the same level which a question about val-
ues may induce. The purpose of rephrasing the question 
is to lead to a questioning of the current solution to 
problems about needs. 
Decentralization Facilitates Taking Responsibility 
How do we go about meeting needs and yet minimize 
professionalization of them? My remarks here can be 
only cursory, but beginnings are possible at several 
levels. If it is important for people to develop their 
capacities for autonomy and to exercise it as freedom 
of choice, then policy makers should encourage resource 
allocations which stimulate individuals, neighborhoods, 
and communities to begin conceiving of their needs in 
terms of the resources available to them and more 
directly under their control. This emphasis on local 
and individual autonomy would suggest a process of 
decentralization, replacing hierarchies with networks. 
It would seek a balance between use of tools which are 
under local or individual control and use of tools con-
trolled elsewhere. This move to decentralization, of 
beginning with values, carries some promise of reducing 
the power of vast institutions over those they are sup-
posed to serve. The modernized poor, the primary vic-
tim of professionalization of their needs, the biggest 
losers of autonomy and freedom, could be a target 
group.* * 
Encouragement of free enterprise zones, which mini-
mize government interference, should be increased. As 
a corollary to this, one may conceive a certification-
free zone, such that skills could be developed and 
practiced without numerous years of unrelated education 
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or compulsory union membership, as was intended in the 
Griggs et al vs. Duke Power Company Supreme Court deci-
sion in 1971.1* In such a zone, the residents might 
actually begin working with one another in small busi-
nesses, light manufacturing, and shops such that they 
are brought together in the neighborhood workplace. As 
neighbors, they might then have something in common. 
Revising welfare programs to encourage defining and 
meeting individual and local needs at that level would 
be a part of this strategy. An obvious idea is encou-
raging development of communal gardens and food co-ops 
instead of merely dispensing food stamps. Traffic flow 
in such areas could be redesigned to slow the speed, 
encouraging the use of walking and bicycles to get back 
and forth to places that are now accessible without au-
tomobiles." In other words, neither expensive mass 
transit nor automobiles are particularly essential if 
what you need is nearby. Much more could be said about 
how this changes the experience of poverty. People on 
the street, working together, defining their needs in 
terms of their values, might become sufficiently cohe-
sive to bring crime and vandalism under control. 
Learning to Live in a Place 
Beyond the encouragement of taking responsibility 
for oneself and the redevelopment of local skills and 
resources to meet locally defined needs there is the 
possibility of rediscovering the place where one is in 
the traditional sense. Presently most members of in-
dustrial society, expecially in urban areas, occupy the 
places where they live as visitors. Relocation from 
one urban area to another, or just the expectation of 
relocation, does little to engender a desire to know 
anything about an area in terms of its history, geo-
logy, biology, or for caring about the long term conse-
quences of our actions on the community or bioregion. 
We exploit, maximize, and move as if the open frontier 
was available to make up for our excesses. Visitors 
come and go, they hold back on making significant com-
mitments, even if their visit may last several years. 
Thinking in terms of local resources to meet needs 
focuses our attention on long range issues such as 
sustainability, carrying capacity, and the like. In 
short, it turns our attention to where we are and 
whether it can support us, rather than mere concern 
with getting more of what we want from somewhere else. 
The desirable outcome would be a respect for place, a 
recognition that we are not just visitors but inhabi-
tants. In a sense, this view asks us to behave as if 
we expect to inhabit our place for all our lives and 
that our children will do the same. Inhabitants of 
rural communities still have some sense of what this 
means, but few policy makers are from rural areas. But 
even rural people see less and less of what meets their 
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needs as being locally produced. Even farmers and 
ranchers typically buy many of the products they could 
produce themselves. The time spent in production for 
use is better spent in production for sale. But, at 
least the potential for meeting some needs other than 
by purchase of commodities is possible, an option not 
available to the urban poor. 
Modernized Poverty 
As already alluded to, the scenario just sketched 
does not advocate community or individual self-suffi-
ciency. Rather, it advocates that communities and in-
dividuals begin to reassert control over tools that now 
dominate them. Institutions meant to help us now con-
trol us. Their professional operators often define the 
clients themselves as deficient in responding to the 
services or products meant to meet needs imputed to 
them. Of course, one could respond that the problem of 
the poor is that their needs are not being met. Who 
could argue with such a classical definition of pover-
ty? My claim is that the poor not only fail to have 
their needs met, but they have lost control over defin-
ing what their needs are or determining how to meet 
them. Modernized poverty may be characterized as a 
poverty in which coping skills other than consumption 
are lost. Welfare families have few skills and virtu-
ally no resources or opportunities by which they could 
satisfy needs other than by consumption. As a result 
they lose control over what their needs are and what 
will satisfy them. Professionals see redistribution of 
services or goods (often their own) as the solution. 
The idea of deciding about one's needs and satisfying 
them through personal productive (as opposed to con-
sumptive) activity is almost unheard of. Imagine a 
Chamber of Commerce proclaiming that personal activity 
to meet needs is a solution to unemployment instead of 
seeking jobs to provide wages. 
Again, our language has changed to reveal our re-
shaped agendas. The italicized "have" in the previous 
paragraph in the sentence " . . . the poor not only fail 
to have their needs met . . . " is an example of the 
change from active doing to passive having. To have 
needs met implies distribution, with the recipient of 
need-meeting goods being a passive consumer. What is 
missing here is the realization that the historical 
loss of skills and access to materials by which the 
poor could meet self-defined needs by their own actions 
is not a necessary condition of urban life. With this 
loss of skills and materials comes a new, more radical 
dependence, a modernized poverty which seems charac-
terized by even less autonomy, responsibility, and 
freedom than earlier versions of poverty. It seems 
quite evident that the poverty emerging in "developing" 
countries is one of dependency, in which the poor lose 
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skills and resources which previously enabled them to 
cope on their own. The vast majority of the poor in 
the industrial nations have already lost these skills. 
For them, the only official solution is training, jobs, 
welfare, income transfers, and the like. One is re-
minded of certain games in which the object is to run 
the country in such a way as to at least avoid riots. 
This of course, involves solving a distribution problem 
in the game. Again, the program of regaining control 
over needs is not to advocate a subsistence village 
economy of self-sufficiency or a Jacksonian rugged in-
dividualism, but to suggest that the tools meant to 
help us are controlling our choices, even our percep-
tion of the kinds of choices available. To raise ques-
tions about needing what we value is to question a so-
cial order and the world view which sustains it. 
Synergy Between Types of Tools 
Regaining control over the techne that undermines 
autonomy and liberty does not mean a carte blanche 
rejection of techne beyond local or individual con-
trol.'7 It means finding, on a local or even individ-
ual level, a point of synergy or balance in using tools 
which are under personal or local control vs. those 
which are not. The appropriate point of balance, syn-
ergy, or control is that which effectively maximizes 
autonomy and liberty. Defining needs in terms of 
values, and breaking professional control over their 
definition, prescription, and evaluation begins this 
process. The goals are shared by those who advocate 
night-watchmen states or patterned end principles. 
This approach finds the end in the means and avoids the 
problem of unwittingly using a largely unexamined and 
presupposed concept of human nature through the concept 
of objective needs and then imposing it by vast social 
programs which either forces or seduces the client-
consumers into the mold of human nature and the proper 
life which a dichotomous-hierarchical needs theory 
implies. There is a concept of human nature and the 
proper life here, but it is process-oriented and moves 
control towards the individual and the local economy. 
Unlike libertarians, it does not presuppose a market-
based industrial economy in which needs are met pri-
marily by consumption of commodities and obtained by 
wage labor. 
Larger Issues 
Rethinking needs and the economic infrastructure to 
meet them is only part of what must be reconsidered. 
Looking at needs from the perspective of needing what 
we value pushes the inquiry further. Justice seems to 
require more than consideration of distribution and 
must also take participation and production into ac-
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count. Our values concerning the domination of nature 
and seeing it as a mere storehouse of resources must be 
reconsidered.1* In this sense, the political economy 
being advocated is akin to much of what is currently 
called bioregionalism, which considers place and its 
natural systems as the source of individual well-
being.1 • People taking local resources and the 
development of local skills seriously will obviously 
have to be more interested in what is available and 
what is possible, both of which require an understand-
ing of the bioregion's systems. To begin looking at 
needs as based on values, is to begin serious philoso-
phy and a consideration of the implications of how we 
live. 
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